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UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION BENEFITS: PART OF
A BALANCED PACKAGE OF RELIEF FOR SEXUAL
HARASSMENT VICTIMS
Meri Arnett-Kremian*
Although sexual harrassment was once a topic discussed so
rarely as to be almost taboo, it now is subject to much analysis.
Books and articles in magazines and professional journals have
helped define the parameters of the problem, treating it both as a
sociological phenomenon and as a legal issue.' Articles discussing
the legal aspects of sexual harassment tend to concentrate exclu-
sively on the arsenal of litigation weapons available to a potential
plaintiff, despite the fact that the vast majority of women who ex-
perience harassment will choose not to sue, and those who do will
often wait years before they are compensated. Although sexual
harassment is frequently a cause of women's unemployment, one
avenue of relatively immediate, partial redress which has been
commonly overlooked is unemployment compensation. 2
This article reviews the comprehensive legal relief available to
* The author is a 1980 honors graduate of the University of Maryland Law School where
she was awarded the Order of the Coif. She is a member of the Washington State and
District of Columbia Bars.
1. See, e.g., C. MAcKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX
DISCRIMuNATxON (1979). See also Safran, What Men Do to Women on the Job: A Shocking
Look at Sexual Harassment, REDBOOK, Nov. 1979, at 217; Solving Your Problem: Sexual
Harassment on the Job, MADEMOISETLE, Oct. 1979, at 116; Somers & Clementson-Mohr,
Sexual Extortion in the Workplace, THE PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATOR, Apr. 1979, at 23.
2. But see Unemployment Compensation Benefits for the Victim of Work-Related Sex-
ual Harassment, 3 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 173 (1980) (focusing on unemployment compensa-
tion primarily in isolation from other remedies available to victims of sexual harassment;
also discussing Title VTI case law as it developed through early 1979).
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sexual harassment victims whose claims are cognizable within the
existing statutory and common-law framework.3 To address a vic-
tim's need for interim financial relief after being fired or construc-
tively discharged as a result of sexual harassment, this article ad-
vocates filing unemployment benefit claims. It sets forth the
principles on which unemployment compensation should be made
available to victims of sexual harassment and briefly examines the
consequences of filing a claim for unemployment benefits and sub-
sequently pursuing remedies based on common-law or statutory
grounds. In order to effectively address the sexual harassment vic-
tim's need for comprehensive legal redress, it is necessary first to
define the underlying problem, the reason for its existence, and the
difficulties inherent in resolving it.
I. SEXUAL HARASSMENT: THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM4
Sexual harassment in employment has been characterized as any
attention of a sexual nature which has the effect of making a wo-
man uncomfortable while performing her job, impeding her ability
to work, or interfering with her employment opportunitites.5 Spe-
3. The discussion of legal theories is not intended to advocate one method, but rather to
explain the foundations of each. Although the author would prefer to see victims of sexual
harassment pursue any available federal and state law claims against employers who fail to
prevent or remedy sexual harassment, it is recognized that, for many reasons, not all poten-
tial plaintiffs will elect to file charges or lawsuits.
4. Although sexual harassment has been a topic of public concern and debate for a rela-
tively short period of time, it is known to have existed since the early 19th century. See THE
FACTORY GiRLs 80-83 (P. Foner ed. 1977). In testimony before a House Subcommittee inves-
tigating sexual harassment in the federal government, one woman noted:
From the early 19th century onward sexual harassment in the workplace has been
one of those conditions which working women have learned to expect .... Early re-
actions to this workplace hazard were divided into individual and group response.
... Those who saw sexual harassment as an individual problem (i.e., one's personal
bad luck) were inclined to suffer the abuse in silence. Those who saw it primarily as a
"social" problem (i.e., a method of driving women out of the labor force or of rein-
forcing their feelings of powerlessness) began organizing around the issue. In the fore-
front of those efforts were unions, protective associations and settlement house orga-
nizations. Out of these early organizing efforts came a drive for protective legislation
for women workers which began even before the Civil War. The focus of the legisla-
tive drive was upon the physical and "moral" safety of female workers. However, the
laws were later overturned and in the 1870's a second wave of agitation for protection
legislation bpgan again - this one surfacing periodically up until the present day.
Hearings on Sexual Harassment in the Federal Government Before the Subcomm. on In-
vestigations of the Comm. of Post Office and Civil Service, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 38, 39
(1979) (testimony of Mary Ann Largen, Director, New Responses, Inc.) (citations omitted).
5. See Hearings Before Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. 465, 512 (1981) (testimony of Karen Sauvigne, Working Women's Institute) [hereinaf-
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cific behavior encompassed by the term includes stares, physical
contact, the telling of off-color stories and jokes which are degrad-
ing to women, the display of pornography, obscene gestures, innu-
endoes, direct propositions, and sexual assaults." The harasser is
commonly a manager or supervisor7 but may also be a co-worker,
client, or customer."
Sexual harassment, whatever its form, is a coarse exhibition of
power in the employment relationship. The harasser may use the
leverage inherent in his superior employment status to demand a
more or less explicit exchange; the woman must be sexually acqui-
escent or face employment retaliation ranging from a refusal to
hire to outright firing. Other common sanctions include demotion,
salary cuts, assignment of less favorable tasks, disciplinary layoffs,
constant criticism, unwarranted reprimands, or unfavorable evalu-
ations for inclusion in the woman's personnel file.9 Alternatively,
the offender may propose that the female employee trade sexual
favors for employment benefits or greater job opportunities.10
In some cases, however, the harassment is not associated with
specific penalties or promises of benefits.1" Instead, a man or group
of men may wage a form of psychological warfare, combining per-
sistent innuendoes or minor assaults with a subliminal threat of
forced sexual relations. In these situations, the "aggressor" never
directly moves to consummate the sexual transaction at which he
hints. He plays with his victim and apparently derives satisfaction
ter cited as Hearings].
6. Id. at 519.
7. In sexual harassment cases pending in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) headquarters in 1981, 106 of the 118 cases for which substantiating evidence of
harassment existed involved acts perpetrated by "supervisors or other management offi-
cials." Hearings, supra note 5, at 336, 342 (testimony of J. Clay Smith, Jr., Acting Chair-
man, EEOC).
8. See C. MAcKiNNON, supra note 1, at 28.
9. Plaintiffs have alleged a variety of sanctions. See, e.g., Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983
(D.C. Cir. 1977) (abolition of position); Tompkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F.
Supp. 553 (D.N.J. 1976), rev'd, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977) (demotion and termination);
Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd sub nom. Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d
1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (unwarranted reprimands, refusal of routine supervision which made
job performance impossible, dismissal for poor work performance).
10. Regulations issued by the EEOC suggest that if a woman trades sexual favors for
employment benefits, other workers may be able to complain that they suffered discrimina-
tion under Title VII. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(g) (1982).
11. See, e.g., Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982); Bundy v. Jackson,
641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Cummings v. Walsh Constr. Co., 561 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ga.
1983); Brown v. City of Guthrie, 22 FAiR EmPL. PRAc. CAs. (BNA) 1627 (W.D. Okla. 1980).
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from his control of the situation and his victim's apparent discom-
fort. He does not seek explicit acceptance of his sexual overtures;
he merely wants the woman to continue to tolerate his behavior.12
The lack of an identifiable sanction against the woman in this
last, more diffuse, form of sexual harassment does not lessen its
impact or seriousness. The constant stress of fending off advances
combined with the fear that the situation may escalate, ultimately
makes the woman's worklife unbearable. She is then forced to ei-
ther quit or redouble her efforts to cope effectively with the situa-
tion. If she chooses to remain on the job, she cannot become visibly
intolerant of the overtures. If she does, she may be fired for her
"attitude problems" or her inability to get along with management
or co-workers. Unless a woman is prepared to risk the embarrass-
ment and scrutiny associated with exposing harassment, she may
be unable to wage a successful legal action, given the legal system's
reluctance to impose liability on employers whose fault lies in not
having prevented sexual harassment."3 Moreover, it appears that
some courts deem it necessary to tolerate some level of sexual har-
assment in the workplace as an inevitable consequence of the prox-
imity of persons of different genders."4
It is also obvious that, to some extent, our society facilitates the
existence of sexual harassment by failing to condemn it. Research
indicates that sexual harassment is so widespread that it is almost
considered a behavioral norm."5 Studies have shown that sexual
harassment occurs across lines of age, race, class, occupation, sal-
12. See Safran, supra note 1, at 217. According to MacKinnon, "[s]ince communicated
resistance means that the woman ceases to fill the implicit job qualifications, women learn,
with their socialization to perform wifelike tasks, ways to avoid the open refusals that anger
men and produce repercussions. This requires playing along, constant vigilance, skillful ob-
sequiousness, and an ability to project [a posture of openness to male sexual demands]." C.
MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 44-45.
13. See infra notes 47-54 & 94 and accompanying text.
14. Early district court decisions rejected claims that any form of sexual harassment con-
stituted gender-based discrimination cognizable under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-16 (1981). See, e.g., Miller v. Bank of America, 418 F.
Supp. 233 (N.D. Cal. 1976), rev'd, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979); Tompkins v. Public Serv.
Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553 (D.N.J. 1976), rev'd, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977); Come
v. Bausch & Lomb, 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacated, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977).
These early decisions generally reflected a belief that women's complaints regarding harass-
ment were more appropriately characterized as personal incidents or natural expressions of
male and female sexuality than as discrimination based on sex.
15. See Sexual Harassment and Labor Relations, 107 LAB. REL. Rrp. (BNA) 23-30
(1981); Safran, supra note 1, at 217.
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ary, and marital status.' Sexual harassment is an experience com-
mon to a large and diverse population of working women; there-
fore, it can be analyzed as a gender-based, systemic abuse worthy
of legal attention as sex discrimination.',
The apparent systemic nature of harassment undercuts the sup-
position that it occurs because of sexual attraction, or a certain
"chemistry" between two individuals. 8 Sexual harassment is, by
definition, the antithesis of mutual attraction since the inherent
coercion robs the woman of her ability to freely choose to enter
into a relationship. The transaction lacks mutuality and the wo-
man lacks the socially-ascribed power to force her disapproval to
be taken seriously; therefore, she is generally powerless to combat
its occurrence without the leverage of management intervention.
The mere existence of sexual harassment is predicated on an in-
equality of power between men and women in the workplace.1 9 In-
terestingly, it is this basic inequality of power that allows sexual
harassment to be both pervasive and invisible. Women typically
work in secretarial, clerical and other support-role occupations
where advancement, both in terms of wages and status, is depen-
dent upon the good will of the supervisor instead of the quality of
the work itself.20 Because there is frequently no written job
description for such jobs, bosses may be granted enormous latitude
in structuring the conditions of a woman's employment and the
nature of the work relationship. For example, employment superi-
ority is often established in this culture through the use of famili-
arities which a subordinate must tolerate but cannot reciprocate.1
Thus, to a certain extent, sexual harassment is unnoticeable be-
cause of its commonality. It is a near-ritual reflection of men's
power over women in employment.
16. See Hearings, supra note 5, at 518 (testimony of Karen Sauvigne, Working Women's
Institute).
17. C. MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 27.
18. Since the individual behavior constituting sexual harassment may differ from tradi-
tional courtship behavior only in the critical element of reciprocity, sexual harassment acts
are often mistaken by casual observers as evidence of a romantic liaison between two
individuals.
19. C. MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 47-55. See generally C. BIRD, BORN FE mLE: THE
-1IGH COST OF KEEPING WOMEN DowN (1970); S. DEBEAuvom, THE SECOND SEX (1952).
20. C. MACKIN1ON, supra note 1, at 29.
21. These include touching, teasing, informal demeanor, using first names or nicknames,
and requesting personal information. Whether or not the familiarities become such an inva-
sion of the woman's privacy and integrity that they constitute sexual harassment is a matter
of perception, but it is clear that some level of familiarity by bosses is taken for granted.
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It is often very difficult for victims to expose their victimization
to others. Because harassment is sexual in nature, victims tend to
feel embarrassed and ashamed to have been singled out and humil-
iated. Since many women are economically compelled to work, a
woman may feel compelled to remain silent because of the man's
threatened retaliation if she exposes him. By choosing to remain
silent, however, the woman ultimately pays a price which may in-
clude loss of self-esteem, psychosomatic illness, emotional break-
down, and isolation.2
Sexual harassment has economic as well as psychological costs. A
1979 Working Women's Institute study found that almost two-
thirds of the women who experienced sexual harassment were fired
or forced to quit their jobs as a direct result of it. 23 Thus, sexual
harassment directly contributes to the concentration of women in
low-status, low-pay jobs by increasing the turnover rate. Because
they have less seniority than men, women are less likely to accrue
the benefits commonly associated with job longevity, such as in-
creased vacation time, eligibility for training programs, promo-
tions, and qualification for participation in such fringe benefits
programs as stock purchase and vested retirement plans.
Sexual harassment also has indirect economic consequences for
female workers. One obvious consequence is the inhibition of
women's career aspirations. Sexual harassment is sometimes used
as an intentional weapon to keep women out of nontraditional oc-
cupations such as coal mining, shipbuilding, or construction. Not
too surprisingly, these are occupations with much higher prevailing
wages than those in jobs traditionally held by women. 4 Because it
tends to reinforce the socially-ascribed "sex object" role, sexual
harassment also diminishes the possibility that women will be per-
ceived by men as valuable, contributing members of the workforce.
In some cases, it may amount to a masculine reign of terror
designed to force women to either stay within the boundaries of
stereotypical feminine behavior and occupational choices or pay a
heavy price.
22. The data from a survey by the Working Women's Institute indicates that 78% of the
respondents experienced anger, fear, alienation, humiliation, shame, embarrassment, and
feelings of helplessness in the wake of harassment. See C. MAcKiNNON, supra note 1, at 47
(citing a 1975 Survey by the Working Women's Institute).
23. Hearings, supra note 5, at 513 (testimony of Karen Sauvigne, Working Women's
Institute).
24. Id. at 514.
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II. OVERVIEW OF LEGAL REDRESS FOR SEXUAL HARASMENT
THROUGH LITIGATION
A woman faced with persistent sexual harassment in her em-
ployment environment theoretically has several remedies available
to achieve legal redress for her maltreatment. The remedy most
commonly recommended is an action for sex discrimination under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,2" assuming that the em-
ployment falls within the purview of that statute.26 Except in cases
of discrimination in federal employment,2 7 Title VII is not the ex-
clusive remedy open to victims of sexual harassment. Other causes
of action might be based on other federal statutes,2 s collective bar-
gaining agreements, 29 traditional common-law contract theory,s" or
tort theories such as battery or intentional infliction of emotional
distress.31 In addition, some states have enacted legislation explic-
itly creating a civil cause of action for discrimination based on
25. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-16 (1981) (as amended by the
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261 (1972) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000g (1981)).
26. Prior to the 1972 amendments, Title VII applied only to employers with 25 or more
employees and unions with 25 or more members. The amendments reduced the number of
employees required for coverage to 15. Additionally, the amendments extended coverage to
state and local governments, governmental agencies, educational institutions, political sub-
divisions, and departments and agencies of the District of Columbia (with the exception of
elected officials, their personal assistants, and their immediate advisors). Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1981) (amended in 1972 by Pub. L. No. 92-261 § 2(2)).
27. Title VII is intended to preempt all other statutory or common-law causes of action
for employment discrimination against the federal government. The United States Supreme
Court held in Brown v. General Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 832-33 (1976):
The balance, completeness, and structural integrity of §717 are inconsistent with the
petitioner's contention that the judicial remedy afforded by §717(c) was designed
merely to supplement other putative judicial relief. His view fails, in our estimation,
to accord due weight to the fact that unlike these other supposed remedies, §717 does
not contemplate merely judicial relief. Rather, it provides for a careful blend of ad-
ministrative and judicial enforcement powers.
28. See United Packinghouse Workers Int'l Union v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 1126 (D.C. Cir.)
(NLRB has concurrent jurisdiction to deal with some forms of employment discrimination
by virtue of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1964)), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 903 (1969); Woerner v. Brzeczek, 519 F. Supp. 517 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (cause of action
for sexual harassment as sex discrimination based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
29. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver'Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (arbitration is concurrent alter-
native remedy for employment discrimination). See also Marmo, Arbitrating Sex Harass-
ment Cases, 35 Ass. J. 35 (1980); White, Job Related Sexual Harassment and Union
Women: What Are Their Rights? 10 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REv. 929 (1980).
30. See generally Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974) (dis-
cussing breach of employment contract).
31. Rogers v. Loews L'Enfant Plaza Hotel, 526 F. Supp. 523 (D.D.C. 1981); Skousen v.
Nidy, 90 Ariz. 215, 367 P.2d 248 (1961).
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sex.3 2 Others, through specific statutory provisions, regulations or
executive orders, have made it clear that sexual harassment is a
form of sex discrimination actionable under state law. 3
An attorney advising a client who has experienced sexual harass-
ment should explain each applicable form of action and encourage
her to pursue such remedies if there is a reasonable chance of suc-
cess on the merits and if the potential plaintiff is willing to under-
take the suit. A client should be cautioned, however, that the pro-
cess of waging a lawsuit is a lengthy one and that financial redress,
even in a meritorious case, can take years to achieve.34 Victims of
sexual harassment frequently experience some period of unemploy-
ment; therefore, the attorney should explain that under most state
employment compensation statutes a form of almost immediate,
short-term financial relief is available to women who are fired or
quit their jobs because of unreasonable treatment, including sexual
harassment.
32. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.030(1) (Cum. Supp. 1983) (provides generally
for the right to be free from discrimination on the basis of sex, including but not limited to,
the right to obtain and hold employment without discrimination); id. at § 49.60.030(2) (pro-
vides for a right of action to recover damages and attorney's fees as well as injunctive relief
for violations).
33. See, e.g., Minnesota Human Rights Act, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.01(10a) (West Supp.
1983), which provides:
"Sexual harassment" includes unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual fa-
vors, sexually motivated physical contact or other verbal or physical conduct or com-
munication of a sexual nature when:
(1) submission to that conduct or communication is made a term or condition, ei-
ther explicitly or implicitly, of obtaining employment, public accomodations or public
services, education, or housing;
(2) submission to or rejection of that conduct or communication by an individual is
used as a factor in decisions affecting that individual's employment, public accommo-
dations or public services, education, or housing; or
(3) that conduct or communication has the purpose or effect of substantially inter-
fering with an individual's employment, public accommodations or public services,
education, or housing, or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive employment,
public accommodations, public services, educational, or housing environment; and in
the case of employment, the employer knows or should know of the existence of the
harassment and fails to take timely and appropriate action.
See also Sexual Harassment and Labor Relations, supra note 15, at 17-20 & 67-72 (compil-
ing state laws).
34. See Hearings on Sexual Harassment in the Federal Government Before Subcomm.
on Investigations of the House Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 69 (1979) (statement of Diane Williams, plaintiff in Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp.
654 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd sub nom. Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978)).
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A. Statutory Remedies for Employment Discrimination Based
on Sex
1. Title VII as a Remedy
Sexual harassment involves treating women differently than men
in the workplace; therefore, it is appropriate to attack the problem
through employment discrimination laws. Although federal courts
initially refused to classify sexual harassment as discrimination ac-
tionable under Title VII,35 it is now established that a cause of
action is cognizable under section 703 of the Act in some factual
situations. The parameters of the cause of action remain in a state
of flux. No consensus exists concerning the circumstances in which
an employer will be held liable for the acts of supervisory person-
nel, co-workers, or non-employees.3 6
The early cases recognizing sexual harassment as actionable sex
discrimination considered claims that plaintiffs had been deprived
of a tangible job benefit because of their failure to acquiesce to
sexual demands made by a supervisor.3 7 Most courts insisted that
employers would be held liable for sexual harassment by supervi-
sors only upon proof that the employer had knowledge of the har-
assment and failed to remedy the situation promptly. For example,
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Tompkins v. Public Service
Electric & Gas Co."' held:
Title VII is violated when a supervisor, with the actual or construc-
tive knowledge of the employer, makes sexual advances or demands
toward a subordinate employee and conditions that employee's job
status - evaluation, continued employment, promotion, or other as-
pects of career development - on a favorable response to those ad-
vances or demands, and the employer does not take prompt and ap-
propriate remedial action after learning of the harassment.3 9
Courts initially rejected the theory that Title VII could be vio-
lated where the sexual harassment created a hostile and discrimi-
35. See supra note 14.
36. Ferguson v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 560 F. Supp. 1172, 1198-99 (D. Del. 1983).
37. See cases cited supra note 9.
38. 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977).
39. Id. at 1048-49. But see Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979) (hold-
ing that the employer without actual or constructive knowledge may be liable for sexual
harassment by a supervisor even if the supervisor's conduct contravenes company policy
under the doctrine of respondeat superior).
19831
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natory work environment even though no tangible job benefit was
affected,4 particularly where a co-worker was responsible. More re-
cently, however, some courts have recognized that sexual harass-
ment may amount to discrimination where the work atmosphere is
made intolerable. 41 For example, in Bundy v. Jackson42 the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that the definition of actiona-
ble sexual harassment must be enlarged to include "discriminatory
environment" cases. 43 The failure to legally recognize the discrimi-
natory impact of harassment which poisoned the work environ-
ment would have left a number of victims without a remedy under
Title VII. But more perniciously, it would have allowed supervisors
to harass female employees without penalty under federal law as
long as the sexual harassment was conducted with sufficient
subtlety.44
In an effort to provide a conceptual framework for the treatment
of sexual harassment and to encourage greater judicial consistency
in the treatment of different forms of harassment, the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) published Guidelines
on Sexual Harassment in November 1980. The guidelines define
sexual harassment more broadly than it has previously been de-
fined by most federal courts, and state:
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual har-
assment when (1) submission to such conduct is made either explic-
itly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's employment,
(2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is
used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual,
40. See, e.g., Clark v. World Airways, 24 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAS. (BNA) 305, 307 (D.D.C.
1980) (sexual harassment actionable under Title VII only when employer retaliates for
rebuffed advances); Smith v. Rust Eng'g Co., 18 EMPL. PRAc. DEC. (CCH) 8698, at 4784
(N.D. Ala. 1978).
41. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982); Bundy v. Jackson,
641 F.2d 934, 943-44 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Brown v. City of Guthrie, 22 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAS.
(BNA) 1627, 1631 (W.D. Okla. 1980).
42. 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
43. Id. at 943.
44. The Bundy court recognized that in effect:
The employer [could] thus implicitly and effectively make the employee's endurance
of sexual intimidation a "condition" of her employment. The woman then faces a
"cruel trilemma." She can endure the harassment. She can attempt to oppose it, with
little hope of success, either legal or practical, but with every prospect of making the
job even less tolerable for her. Or she can leave her job, with little hope of legal relief
and the likely prospect of another job where she will face harassment anew.
Id. at 946.
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or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably inter-
fering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimi-
dating, hostile, or offensive working environment.45
The regulations recognize that sexual harassment may become a
chronic, unbearable annoyance which makes continued employ-
ment unreasonably burdensome, even if keeping one's job is not
technically tied to acceptance or rejection of a man's advances.
Such a situation may arise when the male involved is a co-worker,
client, or customer who lacks the power to directly affect a wo-
man's retention, promotion, or assignments.46
In the fellow-employee situation, the EEOC regulations provide
that the employer is liable for sexual harassment only where it
knew or should have known of the offensive conduct and failed to
take immediate, appropriate corrective action.4" Thus, because a
woman generally cannot rely on other workers to expose harass-
ment, the regulations effectively mandate that a victim must com-
plain to her employer in order to demonstrate in a subsequent law-
suit that her employer had knowledge of the offensive behavior but
failed to remedy the problem. However, when the man engaging in
harassment is in a position of power within the company, the regu-
lations establish absolute employer liability "regardless of whether
the specific acts complained of were authorized or even forbidden
by the employer and regardless of whether the employer knew or
should have known of their occurrence. '48
45. EEOC Guidelines on Sexual Harassment, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1982).
46. However, it can also arise in the context of harassment by a supervisor or other man-
agement official. See, e.g., Bundy 641 F.2d 934.
47. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d) (1982). This treatment is consistent with judicial treatment of
racial discrimination by co-workers. See Chudacoff, New EEOC Guidelines on Discrimina-
tion Because of Sex: Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment Under Title VII, 61 B.U.L.
REv. 535, 545-46 (1981).
48. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c) (1982). This imposition of vicarious liability is consistent with
the holding in Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d 211, 213 (9th Cir. 1979), but at variance
with the actions taken by most courts when confronted with the issue of sexual harassment.
One commentator has argued:
[C]ourts have uniformly found, except in sexual harassment cases, that any discrimi-
natory act committed by an employee in his or her authorized capacity falls within
the employment scope.... As in the common law, lack of employer knowledge has
not barred imposition of vicarious liability. Nor have courts precluded vicarious lia-
bility because an employer had a policy against discrimination.... Although employ-
ers do not ordinarily authorize supervisors to harass other employees, they do author-
ize supervisors to oversee employees in their daily work and to make specific hiring,
firing, and promotion decisions. In Title VII actions, vicarious liability does not hinge
on whether the employer authorized the specific unlawful employment practice or
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Whether the courts will ultimately adopt the liability scheme set
forth in the EEOC guidelines is unknown. The Delaware District
Court in Ferguson v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co.49 expressly
rejected the guideline that creates vicarious liability for employers
in the hostile environment case involving supervisory personnel.
Instead, it substituted the earlier Tomkins5" standard, which im-
posed liability only where the employer had actual or constructive
knowledge of the harassment and failed to implement remedial ac-
tion. The court stated that the EEOC guidelines impose too oner-
ous a burden and that employers should not be held liable if they
seek to alleviate hostile environments by methods such as strict
and prompt remedial measures and strictly enforced, well-known
company policies.5 1 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Katz v.
Dole52 adopted a similar standard, stating that the plaintiff must
show that the employer failed to effectuate prompt remedial action
upon learning of the harassment; however, in order to rebut the
plaintiff's proof and avoid liability under Title VII, the court held
that an employer on notice of sexual harasment must do more than
indicate the existence of an official policy against such harass-
ment.5 Thus, where an employer's supervisory personnel manifest
unmistakable acquiescence in or approval of the harassment, the
burden on the employer seeking to avoid liability is especially
heavy.5 4
Although the parameters of a Title VII action are clearly unset-
tled, for women whose experiences can be reduced to claims cogni-
zable in the existing conceptual framework, Title VII provides a
relatively comprehensive legal remedy. Although recovery often
takes years to achieve, a wide variety of relief is available to suc-
cessful plaintiffs. Title VII compensatory awards aim to make the
victims of illegal discrimination whole, insofar as it is possible to
do so. Lost pay, lost pension rights, lost benefits, or lost seniority
whether it benefitted from the practice. Liability is premised on whether the em-
ployer authorized the act of hiring, firing, or supervising; it is this authorization which
establishes the agency relationship and which results in imputation of the supervi-
sor's unlawful employment practice to the employer.
Chudacoff, supra note 47, at 540-42.
49. 560 F. Supp. 1172 (D. Del. 1983).
50. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
51. Ferguson, 560 F. Supp. at 1198-99.
52. 31 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAS. (BNA) 1521 (4th Cir. 1983).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1524.
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must all be rectified, if they result from illegal discrimination.55
Although a court could order reinstatement in constructive dis-
charge or termination cases, it will generally decline to do so be-
cause the situation has usually been rendered intolerable by the
intense hostility which develops between the parties.5 Where a
plaintiff has tried, but failed to obtain suitable employment, she
may be entitled to claim back pay dating from her resignation or
firing; however, she must prove that she was unable to find compa-
rable employment despite due diligence. 57 Where a sexual harass-
ment victim continues to work for the same employer, it may be
appropriate for the court to fashion injunctive relief. 58 In addition,
a plaintiffs attorney may collect reasonable fees from the defen-
dant to the extent that the plaintiff prevails.59
Title VII is not without practical problems and disadvantages,
however, as a remedy for sexual harassment victims. For example,
harassment by non-employees can interfere with an individual's
work performance as completely as harassment by co-workers or
supervisors, but it is more difficult for an employer to control such
conduct by outsiders. Although the EEOC guidelines suggest that
in some factual situations the courts might impose liability, federal
courts are likely to be reluctant to impose liability upon employers
where there is no practical ability to control the behavior of non-
employees.6 0 Such reluctance would leave some harassment victims
55. See Thompson v. Sawyer, 678 F.2d 257, 290 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Among the items that
courts have included in their awards are interest, overtime, vacation pay, medical benefits,
and pension benefits that would have accrued to the plaintiff during the relevant time pe-
riod. See, e.g., Meyers v. ITT Diversified Credit Corp., 527 F. Supp. 1064, 1070 (E.D. Mo.
1981).
56. See Brown v. City of Guthrie, 22 FAIR EbWL. PRAC. CAS. (BNA) 1627, 1634 (W.D.
Okla. 1980).
57.Id.
58. For example, in Morgan v. Hertz Corp., 542 F. Supp. 123 (W.D. Tenn. 1981), the
court held that addressing sexually indecent comments to female employees was a form of
sexual harassment and discrimination prohibited by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and that an injunction should be issued against the employer, its agents, servants and
employees, restraining them from making these kinds of comments. The court was explicit
as to the kind of comments it meant to proscribe. It said, "By [the making of sexually
indecent comments] the Court means remarks such as 'Did you get any over the week-
end?'" Id. at 128.
59. Brown v. City of Guthrie, 22 FAIR EMPL. PRAc. CAs. (BNA) at 1634.
60. Indeed, most courts are reluctant to hold an employer liable even for the conduct of
its supervisors unless it had direct or constructive knowledge of the offensive conduct and
failed to remedy it promptly and effectively. It is patently obvious that employers have
more control over the conduct of supervisory personnel and employees than it has over cus-
tomers and vendors, but as a practical matter, a sexual harassment victim will find the
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without a remedy under Title VII. Other women have no remedy
under Title VII because they work for employers with fewer than
fifteen workers, which the statute prescribes as the minimum num-
ber of employees necessary in most instances to give the federal
court jurisdiction to hear a Title VII action."
2. State Law Actions for Discrimination
Women who have experienced sexual harassment can also file
sex discrimination claims against employers under applicable state
civil rights laws.6 2 There are fewer cases that rely on state law vio-
lations, but there may be persuasive reasons to file a state law ac-
tion. In some cases, the state civil rights act will cover employers
with fewer than fifteen employees,63 thus affording statutory cover-
age in cases involving small businesses not covered under Title VII.
In addition, state anti-discrimination statutes may provide more
comprehensive remedies than those awarded under Title VII. For
example, the state of Washington allows a plaintiff to recover dam-
ages for psychological harm suffered. 4
experience debilitating regardless of the source. At least one court has implicitly recognized
this, imposing liability on an employer who discharged a female employee who refused to
wear a revealing uniform that could reasonably be expected to, and which the employer
knew did, in fact expose her to sexual harassment when worn on the job. The court
commented:
The Court does not question an employer's prerogative to impose reasonable groom-
ing and dress requirements on its employees, even where different requirements are
set for male and female employees, when those requirements have a negligible effect
on employment opportunities and present no distinct employment disadvantages.
The prerogative to impose reasonable grooming and dress requirements, however, as
this Court ruled in denying defendants' motion for summary judgment, does not
mean that "an employer has the unfettered discretion ... to require its employees to
wear any uniform the employer chooses, including uniforms which may be character-
ized as revealing and sexually provocative."
EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 24 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAS. (BNA) 1521, 1529 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(quoting EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 22 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. Cas. (BNA) 1660, 1664 (S.D.N.Y.
1980) (motion for summary judgment)).
61. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
62. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 363.03 (Supp. 1983) (unfair discriminatory practices); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 48.60.030(1) (1981); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.31 (West 1982-83).
63. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2201 (1981) (prohibits discrimination in virtually all
employment, since the threshold for coverage is one employee). See also Maryland Human
Relations Act, MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, §§ 14-18 (1979). Virginia, unlike Maryland and the
District of Columbia, has no statewide fair employment practices act.
64. In Ellingson v. Spokane Mortgage Co., 19 Wash. App. 48, 573 P.2d 389 (1978), the
court held that actual damages recoverable under WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §48.60.030 (1981)
include, but are not limited to, out-of-pocket losses, recovery of wage differential, and com-
pensatory damages for mental anguish and emotional distress.
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Cases predicated on state anti-discrimination statutes have
yielded mixed results to date. In Fletcher v. Greiner,6 5 a New York
court held that no statutory cause of action was stated where a
woman engaged in sexual intercourse with her employer because
she feared her employment would be terminated if she refused to
acquiesce.66 The court held that the statutory protection of the
anti-discrimination provisions could be afforded only where sub-
mission to sexual advances constituted a condition of employment
and where the plaintiff had refused to submit.6 7 By contrast, in
Continental Can Co. v. State,6 8 the Minnesota Supreme Court
held that the state human rights act was violated where the em-
ployer had knowledge that a woman's co-workers were committing
verbal and physical sexual harassment which made the employ-
ment environment intolerable to the victim, yet failed to take
prompt and appropriate remedial action. 9
It should be noted that if an attorney contemplates filing an ac-
tion under state anti-discrimination statutes with related claims
under tort and contract theories, the breadth of coverage afforded
by state law should be carefully examined. In some recent cases,
courts have held that a common-law claim of wrongful discharge
cannot be maintained where state statutory remedies exist to pro-
tect employees from such abuses. °
65. 106 Misc. 2d 564, 435 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980).
66. Id. However, the court found that there was more involved in the parties' relationship
than sexual intercourse motivated by the woman's fear of termination. She had engaged in
sexual intercourse with her employer for 14 years and had gotten a divorce from her hus-
band because she was in love with her employer and hoped to marry him. Id.
67. Id. It is interesting to note that when the plaintiff refused to continue sexual rela-
tions, the employment was indeed terminated. It might be argued that, once a refusal to
engage in sexual relations is made, if an employment consequence flows from the refusal,
there is an actionable quid pro quo harassment claim.
68. 297 N.W.2d 241 (Minn. 1980).
69. The court cited the EEOC guidelines on sexual harassment by co-workers in its dis-
cussion of relevant authority. Id. at 248. The court noted:
One of the purposes of the Act is to rid the workplace of disparate treatment of
female employees merely because they are female. Differential treatment on the basis
of sex is more readily recognizable when promotion or retention of employment is
conditioned on dispensation of sexual favors. It is as invidious, although less recogniz-
able, when employment is conditioned either explicitly or impliedly on adapting to a
workplace in which repeated unwelcome sexually derogatory remarks and sexually
motivated physical contact are directed at an employee because she is a female....
When sexual harassment is directed at female employees because of their woman-
hood, female employees are faced with a working environment different from the
working environment faced by male employees.
Id.
70. See, e.g., Zywicki v. Moxness Prods., 31 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAS. (BNA) 1348 (E.D. Wis.
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B. Common-Law Remedies for Sexual Harassment
1. Actions Based on Contract Theory
When a woman is fired or constructively discharged as a result of
sexual harassment, she may be able to prevail with a claim that her
employer, by its conduct, breached her employment contract. In
essence, the plaintiff would be asserting that she was discharged in
bad faith and that the employer had a duty to discharge her only
in good faith.
Although this approach makes sense on an intuitive level, it has
not necessarily been accepted by state courts. Most women, and
indeed most workers, are employed under unwritten employment
contracts of unspecified duration. These contracts are customarily
considered "at will," which generally means that either party can
terminate the contract for any reason unless a statute or collective
bargaining agreement prevents termination under particular cir-
cumstances. Because such a rule leaves an employee at the mercy
of an employer's whim, many state courts have modified or carved
out exceptions to the "terminable-at-will" doctrine.7 '
One such exception was created by the New Hampshire Su-
preme Court in Monge v. Beebe Rubber.7 2 The plaintiff in Monge
sought to recover damages for breach of her at-will employment
contract, asserting that she had been discharged primarily because
of her refusal to date her foreman. The court reasoned that the
employer's interest in running a business as it sees fit must be bal-
anced against the interest of the employee in maintaining employ-
ment. The court held that "termination by the employer of a con-
tract of employment at will which is motivated by bad faith or
malice or based on retaliation is not in the best interest of the eco-
nomic system or the public good and constitutes a breach of the
employment contract. '73
Other courts have established protection for at-will employees
by creating a cause of action where discharge of an employee vio-
lates a clear mandate of public policy. 4 Because it is generally ac-
1983); Wolk v. Saks Fifth Ave., Inc., 31 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAS. (BNA) 858 (W.D. Pa. 1983).
71. See generally Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The
Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1816 (1980).
72. 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
73. Id. at 133, 316 A.2d at 551.
74. Such an action is based upon a quasi-tort theory. See, e.g., Parnar v. Americana Ho-
tels, Inc., - Hawaii -, -, 652 P.2d 625, 631 (1982) (holding that an employer would
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cepted that sexual harassment constitutes a form of sex discrimi-
nation, it would be reasonable to argue, in a case where the factual
pattern clearly fits within the existing Title VII or applicable state
law framework, that a discharge based on sexual harassment was a
violation of public policy. As noted previously, however, if state
fair-employment laws provide adequate protection and redress, a
claim under a contract theory may be barred by some courts. 5
Even in states where a contract claim would not be barred, one
aspect of breach of contract claims should always be considered
when making a decision regarding the remedies to pursue. Al-
though sexual harassment generates significant emotional distress
in victims, damages for mental suffering are almost universally
held to be improper in contract cases.7 16 For example, even the
Monge court77 disallowed damages compensating the plaintiff for
emotional distress. Clearly, an award of "actual damages," which
includes only objectively verifiable damages such as lost wages and
seniority, fails to wholly compensate the victim for the subjective
injuries she sustains, including fright, humiliation, sense of
powerlessness, and emotional trauma.
2. Claims Based on Tort Theories
By its very nature, sexual harassment involves a personal harm
caused intentionally by another person; therefore, it fits well con-
ceptually into a tort framework. Depending upon the kinds of be-
be liable in tort where his discharge of an employee violates a clear public policy).
75. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
76. See, e.g., Carpel v. Saget Studies, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 1331 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (denying
emotional distress damages in a suit based on an ordinary commercial contract because the
harm complained of was negligently inflicted). The court quoted the RESTATEMENT OF CON-
TRACTS § 341 (1932), as adopted by Pennsylvania law, which states:
In actions for breach of contract, damages will not be given as compensation for
mental suffering, except where the breach was wanton or reckless and caused bodily
harm and where it was the wanton or reckless breach of a contract to render a per-
formance of such a character that the defendant had reason to know when the con-
tract was made that the breach would cause mental suffering for reasons other than
mere pecuniary loss.
326 F. Supp. at 1334.
It seems unlikely that a court would hold that a breach of an employment contract involv-
ing sexual harassment was one in which the defendant had reason to know when the em-
ployment was entered into that harassment would cause mental suffering. The issue is not
the reality of mental suffering, but the court's willingness to impose on defendants the
knowledge that sexual harassment in employment (always) creates emotional trauma in
victims.
77. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
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havior constituting harassment, a complaint often may be framed
for intentional infliction of emotional distress or assault and bat-
tery. Less commonly, a plaintiff might allege other tortious con-
duct, including intentional interference with contractual relation-
ships, fraud and deceit, false imprisonment, slander, libel, and
invasion of privacy. 8 These actions may be combined and waged
concurrently with other actions, including Title VII claims.7 9
Tort actions for sexual harassment, unlike contract actions, af-
ford the victim the opportunity to recoup damages based upon her
emotional suffering. Tort remedies focus on the wrong done to an
individual, attempting to compensate victims monetarily for both
physical and psychological injuries attributable to the intentional
78. For a more comprehensive discussion of some of these actions, see Montgomery, Sex-
ual Harassment in the Workplace: A Practitioner's Guide to Tort Actions, 10 GOLDEN
GATE U.L. REV. 879 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Practitioner's Tort Guide].
79. In Guyette v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 518 F. Supp. 521 (D.N.J. 1981), the court discussed
the test for pendent jurisdiction. It noted:
The test for pendent jurisdiction, as set forth by the Supreme Court in United Mine
Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 86 S. Ct. 1130 (1966), requires a two-step
determination: first, whether the court has power over the state law claims; and sec-
ond, whether the court in its discretion should entertain them.. . . A court has power
if: (1) there is a federal claim with "substance sufficient to confer subject matter juris-
diction on the court;" (2) the state and federal claims "derive from a common nucleus
of operative fact" and (3) "plaintiff's claims are such that he would ordinarily be
expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding."...
If the power has been found to exist the court's discretion is guided by a number of
factors. The [principal] justifications for the exercise of pendent jurisdiction are judi-
cial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants; "if these are not present a federal
court should hesitate to exercise jurisdiction over state claims." . . . Moreover, if
"state issues substantially predominate, whether in terms of proof, of the scope of the
issues raised, or of the comprehensiveness of the remedy sought," the state claims
may be left for state court resolution. A close relationship between state law claims
and questions of federal policy creates a strong argument in favor of the exercise of
pendent jurisdiction. Factors "independent of jurisdictional considerations," however,
"such as the likelihood of jury confusion in treating divergent theories of legal relief,"
may warrant dismissal of the state claims.. . . Needless decisions of state law are to
be avoided as a matter of comity .... The Supreme Court has held, however, that "it
is evident from Gibbs that pendent state law claims are not always, or even almost
always, to be dismissed and not adjudicated. On the contrary, given advantages of
economy and convenience and no unfairness to litigants, Gibbs contemplates adjudi-
cation of those claims."
Guyette, 518 F. Supp. at 523-24 (citations omitted).
The Guyette court held that pendent state claims for assault and battery, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligence, gross
negligence, and intentional interference with contractual relations should not be dismissed
in a Title VII proceeding, since evidence necessary to prove Title VII harassment violations
overlapped that evidence necessary to prove the underlying state law torts to a significant
degree. Guyette, 518 F. Supp. at 524-27.
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or negligent conduct of the wrongdoer.8 0 The defendant may also
be liable for punitive damages in cases where his wrongdoing was
especially outrageous and reprehensible.8
In general terms, a battery is committed when there is an inten-
tional contact with a person's body and that contact was neither
consented to nor privileged. As one commentator has noted:
A cause of action for battery is established when it is shown that the
man did some act "intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact
or apprehension of a harmful or offensive contact" and a "harmful
contact... directly or indirectly results." Contact with a woman's
body which "offends a reasonable sense of personal dignity" is ac-
tionable. The contact itself need not cause physical injury. If the
contact results in injury to a woman's feelings, a cause of action for
battery is established. Actions such as grabbing a woman worker,
attempting to kiss or embrace her, or touching parts of her body in a
sexually suggestive manner constitute a battery.8 2
The tort of assault is closely linked with the concept of battery
but may involve no actual contact. To constitute the tort of as-
sault, a person's conduct must elicit in the victim a reasonable ap-
prehension or belief that the person has the apparent ability and
opportunity to carry out the threat immediately. The injury which
results is psychological and includes fright and humiliation.
3
The realities of sexual harassment fit well conceptually into the
assault and battery framework. One difficulty inherent in success-
fully utilizing this theory, however, lies in convincing a jury that
the man's actions were neither desired nor provoked by the victim.
To find that a battery has occurred, the jury must be convinced
that the touching was inflicted upon an unconsenting victim. Fur-
thermore, the standard for measuring whether an assault has oc-
curred is reasonableness, that is, whether the conduct would be
"offensive to an ordinary person not unduly sensitive as to his dig-
80. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 161-65 (4th ed.
1971).
81. Id. § 9, at 34-37. The defendant's liability for harm resulting from his conduct ex-
tends, as in most other intentional torts, to consequences which he did not intend, and
could not reasonably have foreseen. This "take your victim as you find her" philosophy is
founded in the belief that it is better for unexpected losses to fall upon the intentional
wrongdoer than upon his innocent victim. Id. § 9, at 35.
82. Practitioner's Tort Guide, supra note 78, at 898-99 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS §§ 13, 19 (1977).
83. W. PROSSER, supra note 80, § 10, at 38-39.
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nity."'84 A common reaction of third parties to allegations of sexual
harassment is that the victim is overly sensitive to advances which
were meant only in jest. Individual jurors may harbor similar reac-
tions, making a verdict for the plaintiff difficult to win.
A similar subjective proof problem arises in actions for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress. This tort, as defined by the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, allows recovery for emotional dis-
turbance where the defendant's conduct has exceeded all possible
bounds of decency and is regarded as intolerable in a civilized soci-
ety.8 5 Liability "clearly does not extend to mere insults, indignities,
threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities."8' The
basic test for liability requires a plaintiff to demonstrate outra-
geous conduct by the defendant, undertaken with either the intent
to cause or reckless disregard for the probability of causing emo-
tional distress. Further, the plaintiff must suffer severe or extreme
emotional distress which is actually and proximately caused by the
defendant's outrageous conduct.
In some states, a victim can recover damages for intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress without proving that she sustained a
physical injury,8 7 but other states require proof of some physical
consequences.8 " However, as one commentator has noted:
Where physical harm results from the acts of the defendant, a cause
of action will be easier to establish. Physical harm includes the
physical consequences of shock to the nervous system, bodily illness,
and physical injury. A woman who has been subjected to sexual har-
assment may or may not suffer physical effects from the harassment.
Even though her injuries may consist of unpleasant emotional reac-
tions to the conduct unaccompanied by physical manifestations, she
may recover for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. Emo-
tional distress includes "fright, horror, grief, shame, humiliation,
embarrassment, anger, chagrin, disappointment, [and] worry." Ab-
sent physical injury, a greater showing of outrageous behavior by the
84. Id. § 10 note 62, at 37.
85. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment d (1977).
86. Waldon v. Covington, 415 A.2d 1070, 1076 (D.C. 1980) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF TORTS § 46 comment d (1965)).
87. See, e.g., Rogers v. Loews L'Enfant Plaza Hotel, 526 F. Supp. 523, 529-30 (D.D.C.
1981) (negligent infliction of emotional distress requires the existence of physical injury in
the District of Columbia, but intentional infliction of emotional distress does not).
88. See, e.g., Forde v. Royal's, Inc., 31 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAS. (BNA) 213, 214 (S.D. Fla.
1982) (allegations of intentional infliction of mental distress do not state a claim under
which relief can be granted under the "impact rule" followed by Florida courts).
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defendant is required.s9
Comments amounting to verbal sexual harassment are generally
not considered extreme and outrageous enough to constitute inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress.90 When such propositions are
combined with a resultant physical injury or evidence of system-
atic harassment, however, a victim may be able to prove that the
defendant had engaged in a course of conduct outrageous enough
to amount to intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The limitations of a tort approach are both practical and philo-
sophical.91 Despite these limitations, tort actions should be pur-
sued as well as actions based on a sex discrimination theory. If a
woman is unable to invoke the provisions of Title VII and resides
in a jurisdiction with no applicable fair employment practices laws,
tort remedies may afford the most comprehensive relief available
to her.
The primary practical limitations to tort actions involve the
problems posed by state workers' compensation statutes and the
traditional doctrine of respondeat superior. In states where work-
ers' compensation is the exclusive remedy for most work-related
injuries,92 a plaintiff may not be able to sustain a cause of action
89. Practitioner's Tort Guide, supra note 78, at 889 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 46 comment j).
90. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 46 (1977).
91. Torts best redress injuries to one's person.... The tort remedy attempts to monetize
physical and psychic damage to the person, sometimes including punitive damages
representing outrage, rather than to formulate redress in terms of hiring, seniority, or
promotion.... To the extent that tort theory fails to capture the broadly social sexu-
ality/employment nexus that comprises the injury of sexual harassment... the per-
sonal approach on the legal level fails to analyze the relevant dimensions of the
problem.
C. MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 88.
92. For example, California Labor Code § 3600 (West Cure. Supp. 1983) provides the
basic standards for California Worker's Compensation. It states:
(a) Liability for the compensation provided by this division, in lieu of any other
liability whatsoever to any person except as otherwise specifically provided in Sec-
tions 3602, 3706, and 4558 shall, without regard to negligence, exist against an em-
ployer for any injury sustained by his or her employees arising out of and in the
course of the employment and for the death of any employee if the injury proxi-
mately causes death, in those cases where the following conditions of compensation
concur:
(1) Where, at the time of the injury, both the employer and the employee are the
subject to the compensation provisions of this division.
(2) Where, at the time of the injury, the employee is performing service growing out
of and incidental to his or her employment and is acting within the course of his or
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based on tort theory unless the pleadings are drafted to establish
that the injuries are not within the scope of the workers' compen-
sation provisions. However, one court has rejected the notion that
workers' compensation statutes bar a sexual harassment victim's
tort claims. The Georgia Supreme Court has held that sexual har-
assment is neither an accidental injury nor an occupational disease
as defined by the workers' compensation statute and therefore, the
claim should be brought in tort.9"
her employment.
(3) Where the injury is proximately caused by the employment, either with or with-
out negligence.
(4) Where the injury is not caused by the intoxication of the injured employee.
(5) Where the injury is not intentionally self-afflicted.
(6) Where the employee has not willfully and deliberately caused his or her own
death.
(7) Where the injury does not arise out of an altercation in which the injured em-
ployee is the initial physical aggressor.
(8) Where the injury does not arise out of voluntary participation in any off-duty
recreational, social, or athletic activity not constituting part of the employee's work-
related duties, except where these activities are a reasonable expectancy of, or are
expressly or impliedly required by, the employment. The administrative director shall
promulgate reasonable rules and regulations requiring employers to post and keep
posted in a conspicuous place or places a notice advising employees of the provisions
of this subdivision. Failure of the employer to post such a notice shall not constitute
an expression of intent to waive the provisions of this subdivision.
In addition, California Labor Code § 3601(a) (West Cum. Supp. 1983) provides:
here the conditions of compensation set forth in Section 3600 concur, the right to
recover such compensation, pursuant to the provisions of this division is. . . the ex-
clusive remedy for injury or death of an employee against any other employee of the
employer acting within the scope of his or her employment ....
93. Cummings v. Walsh Contr. Co., 31 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAS. (BNA) 930 (S.D. Ga. 1983).
It is well-settled in Georgia that mental trauma alone brought about solely by psychic
stimulus is not compensable as an injury.... In this case, there is evidence neither of
any physical injury precipitating the purported mental distress nor of any physical
disability arising from the distress. The distress allegedly is due to the verbal insinua-
tions, requests, and statements of. . . [supervisors]. The result has been embarrass-
ment, anger, anxiety, and great worry, but with no accompanying physical distress.
With respect to the "occupational disease" theory, the case law is not quite as
clear-cut, but still militates against defendant's position .... [M]ental illness [can] be
classified as an occupational disease compensable under the statute if certain condi-
tions [are] met.
The type of emotional distress complained of . . . even if considered a disease
(which is doubtful) is not compensable under workers' compensation. Although the
majority of the incidents allegedly causing the disease occurred on the job, this type
of distress is of a type to which the general public is exposed. Egregious, reprehensi-
ble conduct causing emotional trauma occurs both on and off job sites to workers and
non-workers alike. There is nothing so peculiar about the construction trade and its
working conditions that makes emotional distress a risk not found in everyday life...
. Since plaintiff's emotional distress is not an "occupational disease" the workers'
compensation statute is not applicable.
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The second difficulty inherent in tort remedies lies in reaching
the party most likely able to pay damages - the employer. The
legal system is generally unwilling to hold an employer liable for
conduct it did not actually commit. One commentator has noted
that courts will not ordinarily "impute an intentional tort to an
employer, unless the employer has specifically authorized the em-
ployee to perform the act. Since the likelihood that a corporate
employer has specifically authorized acts of sexual harassment is
small, the plaintiff will probably be limited to recovering from the
supervisor alone." 94
Employer liability may be imposed, however, where there is ac-
tual or constructive knowledge of harassment coupled with a fail-
ure to promptly correct the misconduct."5 However, if the court de-
termines that the employer is not liable for the employee's
intentional conduct and if the co-defendant supervisor or co-
worker responsible for the acts of sexual harassment lacks property
or financial resources, a court victory would be hollow.
III. MAKING A CASE FOR UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS
Despite the availability of comprehensive legal remedies for sex-
ual harassment, many women decline to pursue these remedies,
even where the facts make it reasonably clear that a plaintiff's
right to damages could be established. It is often less embarrassing
to quit a position and find another job than to risk the public ex-
posure that filing a charge with the EEOC or waging a lawsuit will
entail.96
Some women can find a new job immediately and will decide
that the incident does not justify the potential headaches of initi-
ating an investigation. Other women will be fired for refusing to
satisfy sexual demands and experience difficulty obtaining employ-
ment yet fail to pursue the appropriate common law and statutory
Id. at 934-35.
An attorney representing a victim of sexual harassment should, therefore, fashion argu-
ments like those made by the court in Cummings and refer to state law for support where
applicable.
94. Seymour, Sexual Harassment: Finding a Cause of Action Under Title VII, 30 LABOR
L.J. 139, 141 (1979).
95. Cummings, 31 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAS. (BNA) 930, 934 (S.D. Ga. 1983) (citing Ameri-
can Oil Co. v. McCluskey, 119 Ga. App. 475, 167 S.E.2d 409 (1969)).
96. See House Hearing on Sexual Harassment in the Federal Government, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess., 96-57, at 7 (1979) (testimony of Donna Lenhoff, Women's Legal Defense Fund).
1983]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
actions within the time limitations prescribed by law. The ease
with which a woman will find a new position varies according to
her field and background, of course, but it is likely that some pe-
riod of unemployment will occur.97 Because unemployment bene-
fits are designed to compensate individuals who lose their jobs
through no fault of their own, unemployment compensation bene-
fits should be available to sexual harassment victims in all states.
Successful claimants receive a weekly benefit amount based on
the amount of previous earnings during employment and governed
by the state statute.98 Payments begin as soon as the claimant re-
ceives a favorable determination regarding eligibility, even though
the employer may appeal that determination.9 The benefits con-
tinue weekly so long as the claimant remains unemployed and con-
tinues to actively seek employment, until the entitlement is ex-
hausted. If the duration of unemployment is relatively brief, the
claimant will receive benefits until she finds a new job. During this
period, weekly benefit checks insure that the period of joblessness
does not amount to a personal financial catastrophe.
Using unemployment compensation as a form of partial redress
for the consequences of sexual harassment should not be viewed as
an individual palliative for partially alleviating an aggrieved em-
ployee's anger, and thus relieving legitimate pressure for change in
the employment environment. Although the primary benefit of a
successful unemployment compensation claim is financial relief for
the former employee, a collateral benefit is the employer's newly-
created incentive to remedy the problem underlying the claim,
since the firm's contributions to the benefit pool are experience
rated. 00 Obviously, given this experience-based, proportionate con-
97. This is particularly true during periods of high overall unemployment.
98. See generally DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT & TRAINING ADMINISTRATION,
COMPARISON OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE LAWS (1983) [hereinafter cited as
COMPARISON].
99. The holding in California Dept. of Human Resources v. Java, 402 U.S. 121 (1971),
requires this result. The Supreme Court held that section 303(a)(1) of the Social Security
Act was intended to mean that benefits must be paid at the earliest stage of unemployment
when such payments are administratively determined to be due.
100. Generally, the funds to pay state unemployment claims are derived from employer
contributions. The employer's percentage rates vary from year to year, depending on the
amount of benefits paid to former employees during the previous year. This method is gen-
erally termed "experience rating." Under this system, an employer has an interest in chal-
lenging his former employee's claim for benefits since the rate of the employer's contribu-
tion may be reduced if few benefits are paid out of the state fund to his former employees.
See generally NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT LAW PROJECT, LEGAL SERVICES GUIDE TO UNEMPLOY-
MENT COMPENSATION LAW AND ISSUES (1977).
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tribution to the benefit pool, the impact of a successful unemploy-
ment compensation claim, and the resulting incentive, will be
greater where the employer has a small number of employees. In
addition, since businesses with fewer than fifteen employees are
generally outside the purview of Title VII' 10 the financial sting of
increased premiums may be the only effective and relatively pri-
vate means, short of litigation, of encouraging an employer to curb
harassment.
Filing a claim for unemployment benefits does not preclude
other forms of legal action against an employer and it should not
be used as the sole weapon against sexual harassment in the work-
place. If the situation warrants, an attorney should actively en-
courage clients to pursue the short-term relief of unemployment
compensation as well as the more complete forms of legal redress
available under Title VII, collective bargaining agreements, state
common law, or applicable state anti-discrimination laws. Further-
more, a client must be encouraged to make a prompt decision re-
garding the remedies she wishes to pursue, so that she can take the
necessary steps to establish her legal claim within the appropriate
time limitations and begin to assemble crucial evidence to docu-
ment the claim. 10 2
A. Establishing Eligibility for Benefits
Most state laws provide a three-tiered process for eligibility de-
termination in unemployment benefits cases. After a claimant files
a claim, an initial determination of eligibility is made by a claims
examiner based upon an interview with the claimant and written
information supplied by the former employer.10 3 Either the claim-
ant or her employer may appeal the initial determination to a refe-
ree or a comparable appeals-board official at an evidentiary hear-
ing.10 4  If either party is dissatisfied with the referee's
101. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1981).
102. Section 706(e) of Title VII requires that a charge be filed within 180 days of the
alleged violation unless the charge is filed with a state or local agency having jurisdiction to
accept the charge. In the latter event, the time limitation for filing the charge with the
EEOC is extended. In addition, each state defines the statutory time limitations for filing
certain types of legal actions. In common law actions, this may be a period as short as one
year following the occurrence of the wrongful event.
103. In some cases, information may be provided by the employer through telephone in-
terviews with a claims examiner.
104. The evidentiary hearing is more informal than a trial but must conform to the re-
quirements of due process. State statutes may provide specifically that the parties be af-
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determination, an appeal can be taken to the state court having
appellate jurisdiction.
Although there are minor variations in state unemployment
compensation laws, to establish eligibility for benefits an unem-
ployed worker must generally demonstrate that she:
(a) has filed a claim for benefits;
(b) has either (i) earned a specified amount of wages, or (ii)
worked for a specified period of time, or, in some states (iii) both
earned a minimum amount and been employed for the requisite
minimum length of time;
(c) is able to work;
(d) is available for work, which may be defined in terms of regis-
tration for work with an employment office and a demonstrable ac-
tive search for employment; and
(e) has observed the required waiting period, if the state im-
poses one."0 5
B. Avoiding Disqualification From Benefits
Even if the claimant can establish basic eligibility for benefits,
there may be a partial or total disqualification from compensation
during the period of unemployment. State laws generally provide
that a claimant is disqualified from receiving benefits if she volun-
tarily left her employment without good cause, was discharged for
misconduct, became unemployed as a result of a labor dispute, re-
fused to accept suitable employment, or is receiving other remu-
neration such as dismissal pay, retirement pay, or worker's com-
forded a reasonable opportunity for a fair hearing. E.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 95A, §7(e)
(Cum. Supp. 1982). Witnesses are placed under oath and made subject to penalties for per-
jury. The burden of proof in unemployment compensation proceedings is on the claimant to
demonstrate that she has met benefit eligibility requirements.
The referee or hearing officer does not make a determination on the merits of the claim at
the close of the hearing. Instead, a written decision is mailed to the parties and their repre-
sentatives, generally within three weeks of the hearing. If a party is dissatisfied with the
referee's decision, in most states that party may appeal to the full appeal tribunal. Such an
appeal is usually limited to a review of the evidentiary record made at the hearing, although
in some states new testimony may be taken at the discretion of the tribunal. After this
tribunal reaches a decision, any dissatisified party may seek state court review of the admin-
istrative decision. Judicial review is limited to the court's perusal of the evidentiary record
previously assembled. Findings of fact made by the administrative agency are generally ac-
cepted by the court so long as there is substantial evidence to support them.
105. See COMPARISON, supra note 98.
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pensation. The duration of the disqualification period, as well as
the conditions for requalification, varies from state to state.106
Although statutory language governing disqualification is nearly
identical in all states, these provisions have received varying inter-
pretations from state administrative agencies and courts. For ex-
ample, the actions that constitute "misconduct" or "voluntary
quitting" in one state, may not in another. Despite the varying in-
terpretations of state statutes, it is generally possible for a sexual
harassment victim to establish her entitlement to unemployment
compensation benefits in most states. To do so, she must offer
proof which establishes that she had good cause to quit her job and
was not discharged for misconduct. If an allegation is raised that
she subsequently refused to accept suitable employment, she must
be prepared to rebut the charge by showing that any employment
she refused was not suitable.
1. The "Good Cause" Exception for Quitting
State unemployment compensation statutes usually provide that
a claimant is ineligible, either totally or for a designated waiting
period, for unemployment compensation if she quit her last job
without good cause. Some statutes further require that the good
cause be attributable to, arise from, or be connected with the con-
ditions of that employment." 7
This "good cause" requirement has been the subject of much lit-
igation. Courts reviewing unemployment appeals decisions have
generally applied an objective standard in determining what con-
stitutes good cause. One state court articulated the standard as fol-
lows: "[tjo voluntarily leave employment for good cause, the cause
must be one which would reasonably impel the average able-bodied
worker to give up his or her employment. . . .The applicable
standards are the standards of reasonableness as applied to the av-
erage man or woman, and not the supersensitive [person]."'108
106. A waiting period is a noncompensable period of unemployment in which the worker
must have been otherwise eligible for benefits. Many states require a waiting period of one
week before a person can become eligible for benefits. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-44-14
(Cum. Supp. 1982). The waiting period can be waived in Georgia if the unemployment is not
the fault of the claimant. Several other states waive the waiting period under specific condi-
tions. See CO.PAmSON, supra note 98.
107. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 95A, § 6 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
108. See Uniweld Prods., Inc. v. Industrial Relations Comm'n, 277 So. 2d 827, 829 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
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Because the courts have chosen an objective standard for review,
it is impossible to classify a particular type of employer conduct as
"good cause" per se, unless the state statute establishes that the
existence of that particular set of circumstances provides "good
cause.' '10 9 In the absence of a specific statutory provision, the fact-
finder must first consider the employer's behavior and the impact
of that behavior on the claimant's working environment, and then
determine whether the reasonable, able-bodied worker would give
up her employment when faced with identical circumstances. If the
decision-maker believes that the reasonable worker would continue
to work despite harassment, then good cause is not established and
benefits are denied.110 If, on the other hand, the fact-finder con-
cludes that the reasonable worker would feel compelled to leave
her job and join the ranks of the unemployed rather than continue
to endure such miserable working conditions, good cause for quit-
ting is established and benefits are awarded."'
Implicit in the "average reasonable employee" approach is the
assumption that the actual effect of the employer's or co-worker's
behavior on the individual claimant is irrelevant. In practice, how-
ever, a finding of "good cause" is dependent on both the assumed
reaction of the hypothetical reasonable employee and the good
faith of the individual claimant. An employee who was not actually
109. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 268.09 (Supp. 1983), which states:
An individual separated from employment under clauses (1), (2) and (3) shall be dis-
qualified for waiting week credit and benefits until four calendar weeks have elapsed
following his separation and he has earned four times his weekly benefit amount in
insured work.
(1) Voluntary leave. The individual voluntarily and without good cause attributable
to the employer discontinued his employment with such employer. For the purpose of
this clause, a separation from employment by reason of its temporary nature or for
inability to pass a test or for inability to meet performance standards necessary for
continuation of employment shall not be deemed voluntary.
A separation shall be for good cause attributable to the employer if it occurs as a
consequence of sexual harassment. Sexual harassment means unwelcome sexual ad-
vances, requests for sexual favors, sexually motivated physical contact or other con-
duct or communication of a sexual nature when: (1) the employee's submission to
such conduct or communication is made a term or condition of the employment, (2)
the employee's submission to or rejection of such conduct or communication is the
basis for decisions affecting employment, or (3) such conduct or communication has
the purpose or effect of substantially interfering with an individual's work perform-
ance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment and the
employer knows or should know of the existence of the harassment and fails to take
timely and appropriate action.
Id. See also R.I. GEN. LAWS § 828-44-17 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
110. Uniweld Prods., 277 So. 2d at 829.
111. See, e.g., McCain v. Employment Div., 17 Or. App. 422, 522 P.2d 1208 (1974).
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disturbed by the asserted mistreatment is not making a claim in
good faith and cannot be awarded benefits, in spite of the fact that
an average employee would have found the same conditions intol-
erable. Conversely, if a claimant presents evidence that highlights
the impact of her particular mistreatment,112 it will substantiate
the conclusion that her claim has a good-faith basis, and the fact-
finder will be more likely to find that the employee had good cause
to quit her employment.
Whether a specific type of harassment constitutes good cause for
quitting in states that do not classify sexual harassment as "good
cause" per se cannot be stated categorically; however, an examina-
tion of decisions premised on such claims is helpful in determining
how to frame and prove a claim for benefits. In general, a claimant
filing for unemployment benefits has prevailed on one of two theo-
ries which are closely related.
First, most decisions awarding benefits have held that, under the
facts and circumstances of the individual case, the claimant had
established "good cause" for leaving her employment by showing
that the harassment made the job intolerable. In In re Scozzari,11 3
the claimant testified that her supervisor made sexually-suggestive
remarks and engaged in suggestive conduct, which eventually
caused her to develop nervous eczema. She finally quit her job
when he sent her home during a meeting for no apparent reason.
The employer claimed that Scozzari had been terminated for mis-
conduct, but the Michigan referee held otherwise, stating that "the
claimant [had] terminated her employment with good cause attrib-
utable to the employer [and that a] female employee should not be
disqualified for benefits when she terminates her employment to
avoid the sexual advances of a male supervisor.""14 Implicit in this
decision is the belief that some behavior falls outside the normal
give-and-take of employment relationships and the employee need
not withstand abuse.
In another Michigan decision, In Re Prince,"5 the claimant tes-
tified that she was constantly criticized by her supervisor for five
112. For example, the claimant could present evidence of psychosomatically-induced
physical illness.
113. Referee's Decision, Michigan Employment Sec. Comm'n, Appeal No. B78-53236
(May 28, 1978).
114. Id.
115. Referee's Decision, Michigan Employment Sec. Comm'n, Appeal No. B78-11452
(Oct. 25, 1978).
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months after refusing to date him. She complained to his supervi-
sors and sought a transfer to another department; however, the
company did not rectify the situation. As a result of the stress as-
sociated with the harassment, she developed headaches, lost
weight, and became extremely nervous. She quit her job and filed
an unemployment compensation claim. The referee held that she
was eligible for the benefits because she had terminated her em-
ployment for good cause attributable to the employer. 116
The difficulty of making the necessary showing of good cause lies
in convincing the fact-finder that frequent, unwelcome sexual ad-
vances make working conditions intolerable to female workers of
ordinary sensitivity. The fact-finder's willingness to accept this
premise seems to hinge on whether he or she views male sexual
advances toward female employees as a personal matter arising
from mutual sexual attraction, or as an inherently intolerable at-
tempt to tie employment to sexual submission." The Scozzari"8
and Prince'" cases do establish, however, that a claimant can
demonstrate that sexual harassment rendered her employment in-
tolerable in the eyes of the reasonable worker by showing (1) that
116. Although the case did not explicitly involve sexual harassment, a clerk typist was
held to have had good cause for quitting her job in Associated Util. Servs., Inc. v. Board of
Review, 131 N.J. Super. 584, 331 A.2d 39 (1974), because she had been verbally harassed
and mistreated by her supervisor. She was subjected to frequent, undue scoldings during the
day, and her supervisor called her at home late at night to "give her hell." The claimant
testified that she told her supervisor that his behavior was upsetting her greatly, but he
continued to intentionally harass her. The supervisor testified that he was satisfied with the
overall quality of the claimant's work, although he frequently critized her. The court held
that while mere dissatisfaction with working conditions not shown to adversely affect health
or to be abnormal in some other way did not constitute good cause for leaving a job, inten-
tional harassment of an employee was an abnormal working condition which furnished good
cause for terminating one's employment. The fundamental question presented, according to
the court, was whether the claimant had been subjected to intentional harassment by her
supervisor, and thereby had experienced such intolerable and abnormal working conditions
that the average employee would quit in the same circumstances, or whether she was overly
sensitive to criticism arising in the normal course of employment. The court found that the
appeals examiner had reached a reasonable conclusion in determining that good cause ex-
ists. Id.
The reasoning in this case supports a claims decision in favor of a sexual harassment
victim, even in cases where a victim cannot demonstrate that she suffered physical illness or
psychosomatic symptoms in response to the mistreatment. So long as she can demonstrate
that the harassment was intentional and created intolerable working conditions that an av-
erage employee would not bear, she should prevail.
117. See Heelan v. Johns-Manville, 451 F. Supp. 1382 (D. Colo. 1978).
118. In re Scozzari, Referee's Decision, Michigan Employment Sec. Comm'n, Appeal No.
B78-53236 (May 28, 1978).
119. In re Prince, Referee's Decision, Michigan Employment Sec. Comm'n, Appeal No.
B78-11452 (Oct. 25, 1978).
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she was harassed, (2) that she made complaints to management,
and (3) that the harassment continued despite her complaints. 120
It is important to emphasize, however, that the claimant must
explicitly detail the basis of her complaint at the earliest possible
opportunity. Any discrepancy in reporting the basis for a decision
to quit a job may be interpreted as evidence that the claimant
fabricated her story of harassment to establish good cause. More-
over, if an issue is not raised before a referee or hearing board, a
court need not consider it. 12 ' Therefore, the attorney representing
a client who has been the victim of sexual harassment should sub-
mit a fairly expansive hearing brief, in which information about
sexual harassment is presented in addition to the facts of the spe-
cific case. In this way, the attorney can fashion a conceptual frame-
work favorable to the client's position, which in turn gives the
hearing examiner a basis for decision.
The second approach to framing a claim for benefits in sexual
harassment cases involves emphasizing that the behavior constitut-
ing sexual harassment is illegal. Courts have held that the illegal
practices of an employer may give an employee good cause for ter-
minating employment. 2 2 Depending on the statutory definition of
sexual assault in the state where the claim is filed, it may be possi-
ble to show that the offending male had violated criminal stat-
utes. 1 23 Evidence of an employer engaging in such illegal behavior,
120. See also Associated Util. Servs., 131 N.J. Super. at 584, 331 A.2d at 39 discussed
supra note 115.
The absence of complaints to management was crucial to a finding that the claimant left
her job without good cause in two recent Pennsylvania cases. See Colduvell v. Unemploy-
ment Compensation Bd. of Review, 48 Pa. Commw. 185, 408 A.2d 1207 (1979) (holding that
good cause for leaving a job arises only when the employer fails to take remedial action
against the individuals it knows are subjecting the claimant to harassment). Accord West v.
Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 53 Pa. Commw. 431, 417 A.2d 872 (1980).
121. See Pianelli v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 28 Pa. Commw. 496,
368 A.2d 1339 (1977) (sex discrimination claim raised for the first time on appeal need not
be considered).
122. See Zinman v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 8 Pa. Commw. 649, 305
A.2d 380 (1973), in which the claimant quit her job as an employment counselor because her
employer's policy required that all telephone conversations with employers be recorded. The
Pennsylvania trial court held that the claimant had a necessitous and compelling reason for
terminating her employment, even though she had been personally exempted from comply-
ing with this policy after objecting to the employer that the practice was illegal. The court
held that an employee who quits a job can establish good cause by showing that quitting
was required by ordinary common sense and prudence to avoid being a party to, or a par-
ticipant in, the employer's illegal practices. Id.
123. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.79.190 (1977); Wis. STAT. § 940.225 (1980) (making
both unwanted sexual contact and sexual intercourse criminal acts).
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or failing to prevent such behavior by employees, should help con-
vince the fact-finder that ordinary common sense would compel a
female victim to terminate her employment to avoid further
victimization.
In stating a claim, however, the attorney should always empha-
size that sexual harassment is a form of illegal sex discrimination
even where state statutes would construe the harassment as a kind
of economically-coerced sexual assault. In reversing an Employ-
ment Appeals Board decision denying a claim for unemployment
compensation, the Oregon Court of Appeals held that a female em-
ployee had good cause to terminate her employment where the evi-
dence clearly established that she was grossly discriminated
against in salary on the basis of sex. 24 Similarly, the California
Court of Appeal held that the impact of federal and state anti-
discrimination laws must be considered in determining unemploy-
ment compensation claims. 25 The court said:
[W]here one's work is made intolerable over a period of time by the
discriminatory acts of the employer ... there is good cause for leav-
ing employment. Assuring an individual employment benefits in
such situations does insure them against the impact of leaving ad-
verse working conditions not created by them and thus comports
with the purposes of the unemployment insurance laws.126
These cases suggest that, in addition to asserting that sexual
harassment made the work environment so intolerable that any
reasonable woman would have quit, a claimant can in unemploy-
ment benefits by demonstrating that sexual harassment is a form
124. Fajardo v. Morgan, 15 Or. App. 454, 516 P.2d 495 (1973) (reversing a decision by the
Employment Appeals Board to deny plaintiff's claim for unemployment compensation).
125. Prescod v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 57 Cal. App. 3d 29, 127 Cal. Rptr. 540
(1976).
126. Id. The California court wanted clear evidence of sex bias in this case. Moreover, in a
subsequent case, the court made clear that discrimination forming the basis of the em-
ployee's decision to quit had to be present, rather than past, discrimination. See Morrison v.
California Unemployment Ins. Bd., 65 Cal. App. 3d 245, 134 Cal. Rptr. 916 (1977). The
Morrison court recognized that employer-employee relationships may deteriorate when an
employee experiences discrimination because of her sex. One might predict that a female
worker experiencing sexual harassment would suffer decreased productivity and might also
display marked hostility because of her treatment. Indeed, the harassment might have such
a debilitating effect on her morale and performance that the employer might have good
cause to discharge her. In such a case, the employee's attorney should attempt to show that
the sexual harassment provoked his client's behavior, and thus, set up a "good cause" de-
fense to accusations that the discharge was warranted.
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of sex discrimination under federal or state statutes. 127 Thus, in
preparing a hearing brief, a claimant's attorney should refer to
both the EEOC guidelines regarding harassment and the Title VII
cases holding that sexual harassment is actionable sex discrimina-
tion.12 Claimants relying on state anti-discrimination laws should
naturally cite precedent classifying sexual harassment as discrimi-
nation under that state's statutes or similar statutes from sister
states.12
9
In general, however, to prevail on the sex discrimination theory,
a claimant must demonstrate that the discriminatory treatment
exceeded mere verbal insults. Sex-based slurs, without additional
evidence of discrimination based on sex, were held to be an insuffi-
cient foundation for good cause to terminate one's employment in
McCain v. Employment Division. °30 In this case the claimant did
not allege that she had been subjected to sexual innuendoes, pro-
positions, or physical contact, although she did assert that she had
good cause to quit her position because male employees referred to
women by means of insulting terminology and degraded them by
exhibiting lewd pictures and cartoons. The Oregon Court of Ap-
peals disagreed, stating:
Discrimination on the basis of sex is an unlawful employment prac-
tice .... This does not mean, however, that an employer's "sexist"
attitude, by itself, is an unlawful employment practice or such other
127. Such a discrimination-as-good-cause approach was successfully followed in a racial
discrimination case, Taylor v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 474 Pa. 351, 378
A.2d 829 (1977), which deserves close scrutiny because the method of racial harassment
used, and the resulting employee reaction, bears a striking similarity to accounts of sexual
harassment.
In Taylor, the Pennsylvania court held that the claimant had sustained his burden of
showing that he had quit his job for good cause of a compelling nature. The court's analysis
demonstrates an understanding of the detrimental effects of racial discrimination:
The continuing racial tension created by such abuse caused appellant repeated hu-
miliation and apprehension. These reactions were not mere whims, nor were they
caused by any overly sensitive emotional condition on appellant's part. The humilia-
tion and apprehension were emotions grounded in reality and were substantial bur-
dens placed upon appellant's ability to do his job. The degrading and abusive effects
of the repeated expressions of racial prejudice were cumulative in nature and ulti-
mately created an employment condition which would have been intolerable to any
reasonable person in similar circumstances.
Id. at -, 378 A.2d at 834.
128. See supra notes 35-48 and accompanying text for a discussion of Title VII law.
129. See supra notes 62-69 and accompanying text for a discussion of state anti-discrimi-
nation actions.
130. 17 Or. App. 442, 522 P.2d 1208 (1974).
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cause as would constitute "good cause" for a female employee to
quit. "Good cause" would exist only if this "sexist" attitude pro-
duced some actual discrimination, undue harassment, or other griev-
ous cause of reasonable foundation, evidence of which must appear
in the record.'
It is unremarkable that the court insisted that sexist attitudes
alone do not establish good cause, since few employers have totally
eradicated all traces of prejudice against women. What is remarka-
ble about the McCain court's pronouncement is that it would find
good cause only in the event that "this 'sexist' attitude produced
some... undue harassment.' 132 This phraseology implies that the
court felt that some level of harassment of female employees is
both natural and acceptable. Whatever the court meant to say, it is
clear that to win benefits, at least in Oregon, a claimant must care-
fully document incidents which are more serious in nature than
mother-in-law jokes and the posting of girlie calendars. Where a
claimant can lay an evidentiary foundation documenting harass-
ment, rather than the general existence of negative attitudes to-
ward female workers, a court should find that she had good cause
to quit her job.
2. Other Potential Disqualifications: Misconduct and the Refusal
to Accept Suitable Employment
Sexual harassment victims may encounter other barriers, in ad-
dition to the "good cause" requirement, in their attempt to collect
unemployment compensation, particularly in cases where the vic-
tim has been fired. The termination may occur after a woman ref-
uses to respond to sexual advances or after she complains of har-
assment by a co-worker, client, or customer. Since most state
statutes provide that a claimant is either temporarily or perma-
nently disqualified from receiving benefits where she was dis-
charged for misconduct connected with the employment,133 an em-
ployer will often assert that the employee was fired for "cause" or
misconduct. The standard of proof regarding misconduct varies
from state to state. Some states require the employer to show only
that the discharge was a consequence of the employee's miscon-
duct in connection with the employment, while others require the
131. Id. at -, 522 P.2d at 1210 (citations omitted).
132. Id. (emphasis added).
133. See COMPARISON, supra note 95.
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employer to demonstrate "gross" misconduct.""
One additional hurdle impeding collection of unemployment
compensation benefits is disqualification for refusal to accept suit-
able work. Most state statutes provide that such a refusal
postpones payment of benefits for at least a period of time. In
other states, a refusal of suitable employment necessitates a reduc-
tion in benefits according to a statutory formula.13 5 The potential
applicability of this type of disqualification may not be readily ap-
parent, since most claimants are initially concerned only with the
process of securing benefits. However, it is theoretically possible
for an employer to rehire the claimant in an attempt to subvert her
claim. Alternatively, she could be offered new employment in a
company where other women have experienced sexual harassment.
The unacceptability of requiring a sexual harassment victim to ac-
cept such an exploitative employment offer is obvious. A woman
must not be forced to choose between having to work in an ex-
ploitative, intolerable environment or forfeiting her benefits. Such
dilemmas must be resolved in favor of the claimant's health and
well-being. Any employment with sexual harassment built into the
job needs to be recognized as inherently unsuitable in nature, so
that women workers can refuse a position without fearing a loss of
benefits.
C. Impact of Unemployment Claims on Other Remedies
For the victim of sexual harassment, unemployment compensa-
tion has much to recommend it as a form of partial relief. The
primary consideration, of course, is the swiftness with which the
compensation becomes available. Once a favorable determination
is made, the claimant begins collecting benefits immediately. Even
though she may ultimately choose to pursue other forms of legal
redress in addition to unemployment compensation, the woman's
immediate concern with paying for her basic necessities is best ad-
dressed through the unemployment benefits system.
There are other advantages to utilizing unemployment compen-
sation. For the unemployed victim, unemployment benefits re-
present a virtually risk-free antidote. If her claim for unemploy-
ment compensation is rejected, this rejection will have virtually no
impact on subsequent Title VII sex discrimination claims against
134. Id.
135. Id.
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the employer. Each Title VII trial is de novo and district courts
give little or no weight to prior administrative decisions, particu-
larly where the agency is not charged with determining the exis-
tence of discrimination. 13 6
When a claimant succeeds in obtaining unemployment compen-
sation, the award affects other forms of relief in various ways. The
Colorado District Court in Heelan v. Johns-Manville137 suggested
that in calculating damages in a successful Title VII action, the
court should reduce the amount of back pay owed to the plaintiff
by the amount of unemployment compensation benefits collected
during the period of joblessness associated with the sexual harass-
ment incident. Some appellate courts have rejected this approach,
holding that it is inappropriate for a trial court to make such a
reduction. 3 "
A Title VII award, however, could in some instances precipitate
an attempt by the state to recoup unemployment benefits paid to
the former employee, if the governing state statute provides for re-
coupment in the case of a successful action for damages. The Ma-
ryland statute, for example, provides that benefits may be recov-
ered from a claimant "because [she] has received or has been
retroactively awarded wages."' 39 Relying on this provision, the Ma-
ryland Court of Special Appeals held in Katsianos v. Maryland
Employment Security Administration'40 that unemployment ben-
efits can be recouped if the claimant is awarded back pay through
a settlement or through court-awarded damages. If such a statute
exists in the state where a claim is made, the attorney advising a
harassment victim pursuing unemployment benefits as well as back
wages under a Title VII or a contract action should inform both
the client and the court that, in order for the client to be made
whole by an award of damages, no offset equivalent to unemploy-
ment compensation benefits paid should be made from back wages,
given the state's right to recoup the value of benefits previously
paid to the plaintiff from her award of damages. In states where no
recoupment is provided for, the attorney should advise the client
136. See, e.g., Cox v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 471 F.2d 13 (4th Cir. 1972) (district court
refusal to admit into evidence EEOC records affirmed).
137. 451 F. Supp. 1382 (D. Colo. 1978).
138. Brown v. A.J. Gerrard Mfg. Co., 715 F.2d 1549 (11th Cir. 1983); Kauffmann v. Side-
real Corp., 695 F.2d 343, 346-47 (9th Cir. 1982); EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., 645 F.2d 183, 195-
96 (4th Cir. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 102 S. Ct. 3057 (1982).
139. MD. ANN. CODE art. 95A, § 17(d) (Repl. Vol. 1979).
140. 42 Md. App. 688, 402 A.2d 144 (1979).
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that the amount of unemployment benefits awarded may ulti-
mately be offset against damages awarded in breach of contract or
Title VII cases. In either event, however, the client would receive
the benefit of interim compensation during her period of
unemployment.
Because tort actions, unlike contract and Title VII actions, focus
on the emotional injury sustained by a plaintiff as a result of inten-
tional or negligent wrongdoing, damages should be awarded in
such an action without regard to the payment of unemployment
benefits. The harm to the victim lies in the personal injury rather
than in the economic losses resulting from a disturbance in the em-
ployment relationship. 141 It would appear, therefore, that seeking
unemployment compensation would have no impact on later tort
claims, although proof requirements of outrageous and offensive
conduct by the harassing male and its impact on the victim would
be similar for both unemployment and tort claims.
By contrast, a decision to seek unemployment compensation
should benefit a person who later chooses to pursue a claim for
breach of employment contract, since a successful claimant must
demonstrate that she was available for and actively seeking suita-
ble employment. Generally, an employee who is wrongfully dis-
charged from her job has a duty to mitigate damages by finding
substitute employment. Damages ultimately awarded are reduced
by earnings from any employment she secures or could have se-
cured with reasonable diligence during the period in which she
would have been employed, but for the wrongful discharge. One
advantage in seeking unemployment benefits lies in the fact that
most states require that a claimant demonstrate an active search
for employment in order to qualify for benefits. Ordinarily, the un-
employment compensation claimant must document the contacts
and the number of interviews with potential employers, and other-
wise provide evidence that she is diligently seeking a suitable job.
This evidence will be crucial in a later action for breach of employ-
ment contract to establish that the plaintiff sought alternative em-
ployment in an effort to mitigate damages.
In no event will the decision to seek unemployment compensa-
tion undermine or foreclose a decision to pursue other forms of
legal action, whether such actions are based on federal or state
anti-discrimination statutes, common-law contract theory, or tort
141. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 80, § 32, at 8-14.
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law. Thus, there is no reason to not seek unemployment compensa-
tion if a woman's unemployment is attributable to sexual harass-
ment. The benefits merely close the financial gap created by unem-
ployment until the woman is able to find a new job, win damages,
or reach a settlement for her legal claim.
In some cases, the attorney may find that a victim's short-term
financial needs are her only concern. In such an event, the client
may choose only to seek unemployment benefits. In every case,
however, the attorney has a duty to fully advise the client of her
options, including a discussion of the advantages and disadvan-
tages of each potential form of legal action. Statutes of limitation
should be explained, and the victim should be cautioned not to
become so engrossed in winning her unemployment claim that she
forecloses other options by failing to make claims within the le-
gally-prescribed time period. Claiming unemployment benefits
does not toll the 180-day statute of limitations for filing sex dis-
crimination charges with the EEOC, even where the benefits claim
is explicitly based on sexual harassment. In those situations where
the client has not yet decided whether to initiate a lawsuit against
her former employer, she should be advised to take all necessary
steps to preserve her right to sue. Indecision can be later remedied;
stale claims cannot. By opting to claim unemployment benefits,
however, the sexual harassment victim can secure short-term
financial relief relatively quickly, and thus achieve some financial
flexibility for making decisions regarding future legal actions and
for finding a job in which she is hired for her ability, rather than
for her appeal as a sex object.
IV. CONCLUSION: RECOMMENDED CHANGES IN THE UNEMPLOYMENT
BENEFIT SYSTEM
As more women file unemployment claims identifying sexual
harassment as the cause of unemployment, state administrative
agencies and courts will be forced to examine the level of indignity
an employee must suffer before she can safely terminate her em-
ployment with some confidence that she had good cause for joining
the ranks of the unemployed. 142 Officials must recognize that a wo-
142. See Sexual Harassment and Labor Relations, 107 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 17-20, 67-
72 (1981). See also Wis. STAT. § 108.04(7)(i) (Cum. Supp. 1979); Mich. House Bill No. 4183
(Feb. 22, 1979); MICH. EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION, SEXUAL HARASSMENT AS AN ISSUE
IN UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION ADJUDICATION (Feb. 23, 1979).
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man's decision to quit her job in such circumstances is generally a
last resort. 4 '
A woman who has decided to quit a job under these circum-
stances should not be further victimized by disqualification from
unemployment compensation benefits. Attorneys dealing with
state unemployment officials must urge them to acknowledge the
damaging effect sexual harassment has on a woman's ability to
function in a job and to enlarge the definition of "good cause" to
include cases where a woman quits her job to escape abuse. State
agencies must address several related issues in dealing with such
claims. First, sexual harassment must be defined broadly enough to
encompass both the flagrantly outrageous as well as the more sub-
tle forms of sexual harassment. In cases involving sexual harass-
ment, the definition of "good cause" should include: (1) threatened
or actual sexual contact which is not freely entered into and mutu-
ally agreeable; (2) coercion designed to make the employee enter
into sexual contact with the initiator; (3) continuing or repeated
episodes of abuse of a sexual nature including, but not limited to,
graphic commentaries on the woman's body, descriptions of the
employee characterized by sexually degrading words, sexual pro-
positions, exhibitionism, descriptions of sexual acts with others, or
the display of sexually offensive pictures or objects; and (4) the
threat or insinuation that the victim's failure to cooperate sexually
will adversely affect employment, wages, assignments, promotions,
or other conditions of employment. A definition phrased this
broadly is clearly warranted in view of the variety of methods by
which men have chosen to harass women in the workplace.
Second, the attorney representing a harassment victim must
stress to officials that sexual harassment may be practiced in the
workplace by males other than a woman's superiors. The form of
sexual harassment to which waitresses, saleswomen, and other ser-
vice workers are most vulnerable is from customers or clients. A
female worker should no more be subjected to abuse from her em-
ployer's customers than from her co-workers or supervisors.' 4
143. Usually, a woman will fend off advances, hoping that persistant refusals will discour-
age the harasser. After it becomes apparent that she cannot prevent further harassment, she
will quit if she can no longer tolerate the assault on her dignity and self-esteem.
144. See Hearings on Sexual Harassment in the Federal Government Before the Sub-
comm. on Investigations of the Comm. of Post Office and Civil Service, 96th Cong., 1st S.ess.
23-27 (1979) (testimony of Barbara Somson, Assistant General Counsel, International Union
of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO-CLC).
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Thus, the attorney should argue that state standards for claims
decisions should specifically allow full benefits for a woman who
quits her job because of sexual harassment, regardless of whether
the perpetrator was an employment superior, co-worker or client.
Although it may seem unfair to charge an employer with increased
premiums for unemployment claims which originated from the be-
havior of clients or customers over which the employer did not
have effective control, the woman's claim for compensation should
not be made dependent on the identity of the perpetrator of har-
assment if its occurrence made her job environment intolerable. If
the employer has reason to know that sexual harassment of his em-
ployees is occurring and makes no attempt to curtail abuse, then
the employer should be held culpable for the harassment through
the unemployment benefits system.
Third, in appropriate cases, the attorney should argue that a
claimant should not be required to complain to the employer when
the complaint would be futile. Such situations would include cases
where the employer participates in, condones, or tolerates offensive
behavior. Under the EEOC Guidelines on Sexual Harassment,145
employers are charged with the responsibility of preventing sexual
harassment. If a claimant can demonstrate that she was sexually
harassed by a supervisor or manager and quit in response to the
mistreatment, she should qualify for unemployment benefits, even
if she failed to pursue her grievance within the company.
As a practical matter, it might be easier for a claimant to
demonstrate that a reasonable person would have felt compelled to
quit in identical circumstances if she had complained to her em-
ployer regarding the harassment, and the complaint went unan-
swered. Where a complaint to the employer is found, as a policy
matter, to be a justifiable threshold requirement incident to claim-
ing benefits, a credible explanation for the claimant's failure to re-
port sexual harassment to her employer should be strongly consid-
ered as a mitigating factor during the administrative decision-
making process.
Administrative personnel in state unemployment compensation
agencies should be given in-service training in dealing with sexual
harassment claims so that these claims can be processed with a
minimum of embarassment for the victim. Such training should in-
clude background information regarding the nature of sexual har-
145. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
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assment, its effects on victims, and how claims based on such in-
cidents fit into the unemployment compensation framework. In
addition, it would be appropriate to include advanced interview-
ing-skills training for claims examiners and hearing officers, since
claimants are frequently reluctant to detail the nature and extent
of the harassment. Without skillful and sensitive interviewing, a
claims examiner may fail to fully establish the validity of the com-
pensation claim. State administrative agencies should also be sen-
sitized to the needs of claimants who speak primary languages
other than English, since it will be extraordinarily difficult for such
a person to establish a claim when she faces a language barrier as
well as the usual psychological barriers which make many women
reluctant to expose sexual harassment as the reason for their
unemployment.
Furthermore, regardless of the standard of proof required for an
employer to prove "misconduct" as a justification for terminating
an employee's employment, the attorney representing a harass-
ment victim should emphasize that refusal of unwelcome sexual
advances or complaining of harassment should never be construed
as misconduct or insubordination, or as evidence that the female
employee was the cause of a personality conflict.
Even in the case where an employee continues to work after ex-
periencing sexual harassment, but reacts to the situation by be-
coming uncooperative and unproductive in her job, evidence of the
underlying circumstances leading to the productivity decline or
lack of cooperation should be accepted. Claimants must be given a
fair opportunity to establish that they were subjected to sexual
harassment on the job and that subsequent events, including ter-
mination, were precipitated by the harassment. Often a claimant
can show a history of satisfactory work evaluations up to the time
of her refusal of sexual advances in contrast to subsequent sharp
criticisms of her later performance. Thus, when a claimant raises a
claim of sexual harassment on the job, claims examiners must be
alert to the necessity for closely scrutinizing an employer's charges
of misconduct. In some cases, evidence of post-refusal decline in
job performance might be manufactured by an unscrupulous firm
in an attempt to justify discharging a recalcitrant employee. An
attorney should point out evidentiary discrepancies to claims ex-
aminers and urge them to attempt to determine the cause of the
discrepancies. Where the claims examiner determines that an em-
ployee was discharged for reasons other than those claimed by the
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employer, the claimant should be awarded benefits.
Finally, the state standard for showing "good cause" in the con-
text of sexual harassment should not require stress-induced physi-
cal illness as a condition to benefit approval. Although the impact
of victimization can and often does produce physical symptoms, an
agency should not require an employee to tolerate sexual harass-
ment until she develops ulcers, debilitating headaches, colitis, or
other stress-related reactions. Such a requirement is as pernicious
as one which mandates that every claimant demonstrate a specific
detrimental employment consequence resulting from refusal of sex-
ual advances before she can prevail in a claim for unemployment
compensation. "Sexual harassment plus" should not be the thresh-
old test of reasonableness in the female worker's decision to termi-
nate her employment. "Good cause" to quit a job should be found
when sexual harassment makes a woman's work intolerable. When
state agencies recognize this, utilization of unemployment compen-
sation benefits will become a more common method of securing in-
terim financial relief for women fired or constructively discharged
because of sexual harassment.
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